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This paper focuses on simple normative rules for monetary policy which central banks can use to 
guide their interest rate decisions.  Such rules were first derived from research on empirical 
monetary models with rational expectations and sticky prices built in the 1970s and 1980s.  
During the past two decades substantial progress has been made in establishing that such rules 
are robust. They perform well with a variety of newer and more rigorous models and policy 
evaluation methods.  Simple rules are also frequently more robust than fully optimal rules. 
Important progress has also been made in understanding how to adjust simple rules to deal with 
measurement error and expectations. Moreover, historical experience has shown that simple 
rules can work well in the real world in that macroeconomic performance has been better when 
central bank decisions were described by such rules. The recent financial crisis has not changed 
these conclusions, but it has stimulated important research on how policy rules should deal with 
asset bubbles and the zero bound on interest rates.  Going forward the crisis has drawn attention 
to the importance of research on international monetary issues and on the implications of 
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  Economists have been interested in monetary policy rules since the advent of economics. 
In this review paper we concentrate on more recent developments, but we begin with a brief 
historical summary to motivate the theme and purpose of our paper. We then describe the 
development of the modern approach to policy rules and evaluate the approach using experiences 
before, during, and after the Great Moderation. We then contrast in detail this policy rule 
approach with optimal control methods and discretion. Finally we go on to consider several key 
policy issues, including the zero bound on interest rates and issue of bursting bubbles, using the 
lens of policy rules. 
 
1.  Historical Background 
  Adam Smith first delved into the subject monetary policy rules in the Wealth of Nations 
arguing that “a well-regulated paper-money” could have significant advantages in improving 
economic growth and stability compared to a pure commodity standard.   By the start of the 19
th 
century Henry Thornton and then David Ricardo were stressing the importance of rule-guided 
monetary policy after they saw the monetary-induced financial crises related to the Napoleonic 
Wars.  Early in the 20
th century Irving Fisher and Knut Wicksell were again proposing monetary 
policy rules to avoid monetary excesses of the kinds that led to hyperinflation following World 
War I or seemed to be causing the Great Depression.  And later, after studying the severe 
monetary mistakes of the Great Depression, Milton Friedman proposed his constant growth rate 
rule with the aim of avoiding a repeat of those mistakes. Finally, modern-day policy rules, such 
as the Taylor (1993a) Rule, were aimed at ending the severe price and output instability during 
the Great Inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s (see also Asso, Kahn, and Leeson, 2007, for a 
detailed review). 3 
 
  As the history of economic thought makes clear, a common purpose of these reform 
proposals was a simple, stable monetary policy that would both avoid creating monetary shocks 
and cushion the economy from other disturbances, and thereby reduce the chances of recession, 
depression, crisis, deflation, inflation, and hyperinflation. There was a presumption in this work 
that some such simple rule could improve policy by avoiding monetary excesses, whether related 
to money finance of deficits, commodity discoveries, gold outflows, or mistakes by central 
bankers with too many objectives.  In this context, the choice between a monetary standard 
where the money supply jumped around randomly versus a simple policy rule with a smoothly 
growing money and credit seemed obvious.  The choice was both broader and simpler than 
“rules versus discretion.”  It was “rules versus chaotic monetary policy” whether the chaos was 
caused by discretion or unpredictable exogenous events like gold discoveries or shortages. 
  A significant change in economists’ search for simple monetary policy rules occurred in 
the 1970s, however, as a new type of macroeconomic model appeared on the scene.  The new 
models were dynamic, stochastic, and empirically estimated.  But more important, these 
empirical models incorporated both rational expectations and sticky prices, and they therefore 
were sophisticated enough to serve as a laboratory to examine how monetary policy rules would 
work in practice.  These were the models that were used to find new policy rules, such as the 
Taylor Rule, to compare the new rules with earlier constant growth rate rules or with actual 
policy, and to check the rules for robustness.  Examples of empirical modes with rational 
expectations and sticky prices include the simple three equation econometric model of the United 
States in Taylor (1979), the multi-equation international models in the comparative studies by 
Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), and the econometric models in robustness analyses of Levin, 
Wieland, and Williams (1999).  More or less simultaneously, practical experience was 4 
 
confirming the model simulation results as the instability of the Great Inflation of the 1970s gave 
way to the Great Moderation around the same time that actual monetary policy began to 
resemble the simple policy rules that were proposed. 
  While the new rational expectations models with sticky prices further supported the use 
of policy rules—in keeping with the Lucas (1976) critique and time inconsistency (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977)—there was no fundamental reason why the same models could not be used to 
study more complex discretionary monetary policy actions which went well beyond simple rules 
and used optimal control theory. Indeed, before long optimal control theory was being applied to 
the new models, refined with specific micro-foundations as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), 
Woodford (2003), and others.   The result was complex paths for the instruments of policy which 
had the appearances of “fine tuning” as distinct from simple policy rules.   
  The idea that optimal policy conducted in real time without the constraint of simple rules 
could do better than simple rules thus emerged within the context of the modern modeling 
approach.  The papers by Mishkin (2007) and Walsh (2009) at recent Jackson Hole Conferences 
are illustrative.  Mishkin (2007) uses optimal control to compute paths for the federal funds rate 
and contrasts the results with simple policy rules, stating that in the optimal discretionary policy 
“the federal funds rate is lowered more aggressively and substantially faster than with the 
Taylor-rule….This difference is exactly what we would expect because the monetary authority 
would not wait to react until output had already fallen.”  The implicit recommendation of this 
statement is that simple policy rules are inadequate for real world policy situations and that 
policymakers should therefore deviate from them as needed.  
  The differences in these approaches are profound and have important policy implications.  
At the same Jackson Hole conference that Mishkin (2007) emphasized the advantages of 5 
 
deviating from policy rules, Taylor (2007) showed that one such deviation added fuel to the 
housing boom and thereby helped bring on the severe financial crisis, the deep recession, and 
perhaps the end of the Great Moderation.  For these reasons we focus on the differences between 
these two approaches in this paper.  Like all previous studies of monetary policy rules by 
economists, our goal is to find ways to avoid such economic maladies.   
  We start in the next section with a review of the development of optimal simple monetary 
policy rules using quantitative models. We then consider the robustness of policy rules using 
comparative model simulations and show that simple rules are more robust than fully optimal 
rules.  The most recent paper in the Elsevier Handbook in Economics series on monetary policy 
rules is the comprehensive and widely-cited survey published by Ben McCallum (1999) in the 
Handbook of Macroeconomics (Taylor and Woodford, 1999).  Our paper and McCallum’s are 
similar in scope in that they focus on policy rules which have been designed for normative 
purposes rather than on policy reaction functions which have been estimated for positive or 
descriptive purposes.  In other words, the rules we study have been derived from economic 
theory or models and are designed to deliver good economic performance, rather than to fit 
statistically the decisions of central banks.  Of course, such normative policy rules can also be 
descriptive if central bank decisions follow the recommendations of the rules which they have in 
many cases.  Research of an explicitly descriptive nature, which focuses more  on estimating 
reaction functions for central banks, goes back to Dewald and Johnson (1963), Fair (1978), and 
McNees (1986), and includes, more recently, work by Meyer (2009) on estimating policy rules 
for the Federal Reserve.  
 McCallum’s  Handbook of Macroeconomics paper stressed the importance of robustness 
of policy rules and explored the distinction between rules and discretion using the time 6 
 
inconsistency principles. His survey also clarified important theoretical issues such as uniqueness 
and determinacy and he reviewed research on alternative targets and instruments, including both 
money supply and interest rate instruments.  Like McCallum we focus on the robustness of 
policy rules. We focus on policy rules where the interest rate rather than the money supply is the 
policy instrument, and we place more emphasis on the historical performance of policy rules 
reflecting the experience of the dozen years since McCallum wrote.  We also examine issues that 
have been major topics of research in academic and policy circles since then, including policy 
inertia, learning, and measurement errors. We also delve into the issues that arose in the recent 
financial crisis including the zero lower bound on interest rates and dealing with asset price 
bubbles.  In this sense, our paper is complementary to McCallum’s useful Handbook of 
Macroeconomics paper on monetary policy rules.  
 
2. Using Models to Evaluate Simple Policy Rules  
  The starting point for our review of monetary policy rules is the research that began in the 
mid 1970s, took off in the 1980s and 1990s, and is still expanding.  As mentioned above, this 
research is conceptually different from previous work by economists in that it is based on 
quantitative macroeconomic models with rational expectations and frictions/rigidities, usually in 
wage and price setting.   
  We focus on the research based on such models because it seems to have led to an 
explosion of practical as well as academic interest in policy rules.  As evidence consider, Don 
Patinkin’s (1956) Money, Interest, and Prices, which was the textbook in monetary theory in 
many graduate school in the early 1970s. It has very few references to monetary policy rules. In 
contrast, the modern day equivalent, Michael Woodford’s (2003) book, Interest and Prices, is 7 
 
packed with discussions about monetary policy rules. In the meantime, thousands of papers have 
been written on monetary policy rules since the mid 1970s. The staffs of central banks around 
the world regularly use policy rules in their research and policy evaluation (see for example, 
Orphanides, 2008) as do practitioners in the financial markets.  
  Such models were originally designed to answer questions about policy rules. The 
rational expectations assumption brought attention to the importance of consistency over time 
and to predictability, whether about inflation or policy rule responses, and to a host of policy 
issues including how to affect long term interest rates and what to do about asset bubbles.  The 
price and wage rigidity assumption gave a role for monetary policy that was not evident in pure 
rational expectations models without price or wage rigidities; the monetary policy rule mattered 
in these models even if everyone knew what it was. 
  The list of such models is now way too long to even tabulate, let alone discuss, in this 
review paper, but they include the rational expectations models in the Bryant, Hooper, Mann 
(1993) volume, the Taylor (1999a) volume, the Woodford (2003) volume, and many more 
models now in the growing database maintained by Volker Wieland (see Taylor and Wieland, 
2009).   Many of these models go under the name “new Keynesian” or “new neoclassical 
synthesis” or sometimes “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.”  Some are estimated and 
others are calibrated.  Some are based on explicit utility maximization foundations, others more 
ad hoc. Some are illustrative three-equation models, which consist of an IS or Euler equation, a 
staggered price setting equation, and a monetary policy rule.  Others consist of more than 100 




Dynamic Stochastic Simulations of Simple Policy Rules 
  The general way that policy rule research originally began in these models was to 
experiment with different policy rules, trying them out in the model economies, and seeing how 
economic performance was affected  The criteria for performance was usually the size of the 
deviations of inflation or real GDP or unemployment from some target or natural values. At a 
basic level a monetary policy rule is a contingency plan that lays out how monetary policy 
decisions should be made. For research with models, the rules have to be written down 
mathematically.  Policy researchers would try out policy rules with different functional forms, 
different instruments, and different variables for the instrument to respond to. They would then 
search for the ones that worked well when simulating the model stochastically with a series of 
realistic shocks.  To find better rules, researchers searched over a range of possible functional 
forms or parameters looking for policy rules that improved economic performance.  In simple 
models, such as Taylor (1979), optimization methods could be used to assist in the search.  
  A concrete example of this approach to simulating alternative policy rules was the model 
comparison project started in the 1980s at the Brookings Institution and organized by Ralph 
Bryant and others. After the model comparison project had gone on for several years, several 
participants decided it would be useful to try out monetary policy rules in these models.  The 
important book by Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) was one output of the resulting policy rules 
part of the model comparison project.  It brought together many rational expectations models, 
including the multicountry model later published in Taylor (1993b).      
  No one clear “best” policy rule emerged from this work and, indeed, the contributions to 
the Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) volume did not recommend any single policy rule. See 
Henderson and McKibbin (1993) for analysis of the types of rules in this volume. Indeed, as is so 9 
 
often the case in economic research, critics complained about apparent disagreement about what 
was the best monetary policy rule.   Nevertheless, if one looked carefully through the simulation 
results from the different models, one could see that the better policy rules had three general 
characteristics: (1) an interest rate instrument performed better than a money supply instrument, 
(2) interest rate rules that reacted to both inflation and real output worked better than rules which 
focused on either one, and (3) interest rate rules which reacted to the exchange rate were inferior 
to those that did not.   
One specific rule that was derived from this type of simulation research with monetary 
models is the Taylor Rule.  .  The Taylor Rule says that the short-term interest rate, it, should be 
set according to the formula:    
              0 . 5              0 . 5      ,      ( 1 )  
where r* denotes the equilibrium real interest rate, πt denotes the inflation rate in period t, π
* is 
the desired long-run, or “target,” inflation rate, and y denotes the output gap(the percent 
deviation of real GDP from its potential level).  Taylor (1993a) set the equilibrium interest rate 
r* equal to 2 and the target inflation rate π
* equal to 2.  Thus, rearranging terms, the Taylor Rule 
says that the short term interest rate should equal one-and-a-half times the inflation rate plus one-
half times the output gap plus one.  Taylor focused on quarterly observations and suggested 
measuring the inflation rate as a moving average of inflation over four quarters.  Simulations 
suggested that response coefficients on inflation and the output gap in the neighborhood of ½ 
would work well.  Note that when the economy is in steady state with the inflation rate equaling 
its target and the output gap equaling zero, the real interest rate (the nominal rate minus the 
expected inflation rate) equals the equilibrium real interest rate.  10 
 
This rule embodies two important characteristics of monetary policy rules that are 
effective at stabilizing inflation and the output gap in model simulations.  First, it dictates that the 
nominal interest rate react by more than one-for-one to movements in the inflation rate.  This 
characteristic has been termed the Taylor principle (Woodford 2001).  In most existing 
macroeconomic models, this condition (or some close variant of it) must be met for a unique 
stable rational expectations to exist (see Woodford, 2003, for a complete discussion). The basic 
logic behind this principle is clear: when inflation rises, monetary policy needs to raise the real 
interest rate in order to slow the economy and reduce inflationary pressures.  The second 
important characteristic is that monetary policy “leans against the wind,” that is, it reacts by 
increasing the interest rate by a particular amount when real GDP rises above potential GDP and 
by decreasing the interest rate by the same amount when real GDP falls below potential GDP.  In 
this way, monetary policy speeds the economy’s progress back to the target rate of inflation and 
the potential level of output.  
 
Optimal Simple Rules              
  Much of the more recent research on monetary policy rules has tended to follow a similar 
approach except that the models have been formalized to include more explicit micro-
foundations and the quantitative evaluation methodology has focused on specific issues related to 
the optimal specification and parameterization of simple policy rules like the Taylor Rule.  To 
review this research, it is useful to consider the following quadratic central bank loss function: 
                                            ( 2 )  
where E denotes the mathematical unconditional expectation and λ, υ  ≥ 0 are parameters 
describing the central bank’s preferences.  The first two terms represent the welfare costs 11 
 
associated from nominal and real fluctuations from desired levels.  The third term stands in for 
the welfare costs associated with large swings in interest rates (and presumably other asset 
prices).  The quadratic terms, especially those involving inflation and output, represent the 
common sense view that business cycle fluctuations and high or variable inflation and interest 
rates are undesirable, but these can also be derived as approximations of welfare functions of 
representative agents.  In some studies these costs are modeled explicitly.
1   
The central bank’s problem is to choose the parameters of a policy rule to minimize the 
expected central bank loss subject to the constraints imposed by the model and where the 
monetary policy instrument—generally assumed to be the short-term interest rate in recent 
research—follows the stipulated policy rule. Williams (2003) describes numerical methods used 
to compute the model-generated unconditional moments and optimized parameter values of the 
policy rule in the context of a linear rational expectations model.  Early research--see, for 
example the contributions in Taylor (1999a) and Fuhrer (1997)--focused on rules of a form that 
generalized the original Taylor Rule
2: 
         1                                                       .      (3)   
This rule incorporates inertia in the behavior of the interest rate through a positive value of the 
parameter ρ.  It also allows for the possibility that policy responds to expected future (or lagged) 
values of inflation and the output gap.         
A useful way to portray macroeconomic performance under alternative specifications of 
the policy rule is the policy frontier, which describes the best achievable combinations of 
                                                            
1 See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of the relationship between the central bank loss function and the the 
welfare function of households.  See Rudebusch (2006) for analyses of this topic of interest rate variability in the 
central bank’s loss function.  In the policy evaluation literature, the loss is frequently specified in terms of the 
squared first-difference of the interest rate, rather than in terms of the squared difference between the interest rate 
and the natural rate of interest.      
2 An alternative approach is followed by Fair and Howrey (1996), who do not use unconditional moments to 
evaluate policies, but instead compute the optimal policy setting of based on counterfactual simulations of the U.S. 
economy during the postwar period. . 12 
 
variability in the objective variables obtainable in a class of policy rule.  In the case of two 
objectives of inflation and the output gap that was originally studied by Taylor (1979), this can 
be represented by a two-dimensional curve plotting the unconditional variances (or standard 
deviations) of these variables.  In the case of three objective variables, the frontier is a three-
dimensional surface, which can be difficult to see clearly on the printed page.  The solid line in 
Figure 1 plots a cross section of the policy frontier, corresponding to a fixed variance of the 
interest rate, for a particular specification of the policy rule.
3 The optimal parameters of the 
policy rules that underlie these frontiers depend on the relative weights placed on the 
stabilization of the variables in the central bank loss.  These are constructed using the Federal 
Reserve Board’s FRB/US large-scale rational expectations model (Williams, 2003).  
  One key issue for simple policy rules is the appropriate measure of inflation to include in 
the rule.  In many models (see, for example, Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999, 2003), simple 
rules that respond to smoothed inflation rates such as the one-year rate typically perform better 
than those that respond to the one-quarter inflation rate, even though the objective is to stabilize 
the one-quarter rate.  In the FRB/US model, the rule that responds to the three-year average 
inflation rate performs the best and it is this specification that is used in the results reported for 
FRB/US in this paper.  Evidently, rules that respond to a smoothed measure of inflation avoid 
sharp swings in interest rates in response to transitory swings in the inflation rate.   
Indeed, the simple policy rules that respond to the percent difference between the price 
level and a deterministic trend performs nearly as well as those that respond to the difference 
between the inflation rate and its target rate (see Svensson 1999 or further discussion on this 
topic).  In the case of a price level target, the policy rule is specified as: 
                                                            
3 The variance of the short-term interest rate is set to 16 for the FRB/US results reported in this paper.  Note that in 
this model, the optimal simple rule absent any penalty on interest rate variability yields a variance of the interest rate 
far in excess of 16.  13 
 
         1                                                    .      (4)   
where pt is the log of the price level and p* is the log of the target prices level, which is assumed 
to increase at a deterministic rate. The policy frontier for this type of price-targeting policy rule 
is shown in Figure 1. We will return to the topic of rules that respond to price-levels versus 
inflation later. 
  A second key issue regarding the specification of simple rules is to what extent they 
should respond to expectations of future inflation and output gaps. Batini and Haldane (1999) 
argue that the presence of lags in the monetary transmission mechanism argues for policy to be 
forward looking.  However, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Levin, Wieland, and Williams 
(2003), and Orphanides and Williams (2007a) investigate the optimal choice of lead structure in 
the policy rule in various models and do not find a significant benefit from responding to 
expectations out further than one year for inflation or beyond the current quarter for the output 
gap.  Indeed, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) show that rules that respond to inflation 
forecasts further into the future are prone to generating indeterminacy in rational expectations 
models.         
   A third key issue is policy inertia or “interest rate smoothing.” A significant degree of 
inertia can significantly help improve performance in forward-looking models like FRB/US.  
Figure 2 compares the policy frontier for the optimized three-parameter rules to that for “level” 
rules with no inertia (ρ = 0).   As seen in the figure, except for the case where the loss puts all the 
weight on inflation stabilization, the inertial rule performs better than the level rule. In fact, in 
these types of models the optimal value of ρ tends to be close to unity and in some models can be 
greatly in excess of one, as discussed later.  As discussed in Levin, Wieland, and Williams 
(1999) and Woodford (1999, 2003), inertial rules take advantage of the expectations of future 14 
 
policy and economic developments in influencing outcomes.  For example, in many forward-
looking models of inflation, a policy rule that generates a sustained small negative output gap has 
as much effect on current inflation as a policy that generates a short-lived large negative gap.  
But, the former policy accomplishes this with a small sum of squared output gaps.  As discussed 
later, in purely backward-looking models, however, this channel is entirely absent and highly 
inertial policies perform poorly.         
  The analysis of optimal simple rules described up to this point has abstracted from 
several important limitations of monetary policy in practice.  One issue is the measurement of 
variables in the policy rule, especially the output gap.  The second, which has gained increased 
attention because of the experiences of Japan since the 1990s and several other major economies 
starting in 2008, is the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.  The third is 
the potential role of other variables in the policy rule, including asset prices.  We take up each of 
these in turn. 
  
Measurement issues and the output gap 
   One practical issue that affects the implementation of monetary policy is the 
measurement of variables of interest such as the inflation rate and the output gap (Orphanides 
2001).   Many macroeconomic data series such as GDP and price deflators are subject to 
measurement errors and revisions.  In addition, both the equilibrium real interest rate and the 
output gap are unobserved variables. Potential errors in measuring  the equilibrium real interest 
rate and the output gap  result from estimating latent variables as well as uncertainty regarding 
the processes determining them (Orphanides and van Norden, 2002, Laubach and Williams 
2003, and Edge, Laubach, and Williams, 2010).   Similar problems plague estimation of related 15 
 
metrics such as the unemployment gap (defined to be the difference between the unemployment 
rate and the natural rate of unemployment) and the capacity utilization gap.  Arguably, the late 
1960s and1970s were a period when errors in measuring the output and unemployment gap were 
particularly severe, but difficulties in measuring gaps extend into the present day (Orphanides 
2002, Orphanides and Williams, 2010).     
A number of papers have examined the implications of errors in the measurement of the 
output (or unemployment) gap for monetary policy rules, starting with Orphanides (1998), Smets 
(1999), Orphanides et al (2000), McCallum (2001), and Rudebusch (2001).  A general finding in 
this literature is that the optimal coefficient on the output gap in the policy rule declines in the 
presence of errors in measuring the output gap. The logic behind this result is straightforward.  
The response to the mismeasured output gap adds unwanted noise to the setting of policy which 
can be reduced by lowering the coefficient on the gap in the rule.  The optimal response to 
inflation may rise or fall depending on the model and the weights in the objective function.   
In addition to the problem of measurement of the output gap, the equilibrium real interest 
rate is not a known quantity and may vary over time (Laubach and Williams, 2003).  Orphanides 
and Williams (2002) examine the combined problem of unobservable unemployment gap and 
equilibrium real interest rate. In their model, the unemployment gap is the measure of economic 
activity in both the objective function and the policy rule.  They consider a more generalized 
policy rule of the form: 
         1      ̂ 
                                                       .     (5)  
where  ̂ 
   (    ) denotes the central bank’s real-time estimate of the equilibrium real interest rate 
(unemployment gap) in period t, and Δut denotes the first-difference of the unemployment rate.  16 
 
The presence of mismeasurement of the natural rate of interest and the natural rate of 
unemployment tends to move the optimal policy toward greater inertia.  Figure 3 shows the 
optimal coefficients of this policy rule for a particular specification of the central bank loss as the 
degree of variability in the equilibrium real interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment 
rises.  The case where these variables are constant and known by the central bank is indicated by 
the value of zero on the horizontal axis.  In that case, the optimal policy is characterized by a 
moderate degree of policy inertia.  The case of a moderate degree of variability of these latent 
variables, consistent with the lower end of the range of estimates of variability, is indicated by 
the value of 1 on the horizontal axis.  Values of 2 and above correspond to cases where these 
latent variables are subject to more sizable fluctuations, consistent with the upper end of 
estimates of their variability. In these cases, the central bank’s estimates of the equilibrium real 
interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment are imprecise, and the optimal value of ρ rises 
to near unity.  In such cases, the equilibrium real interest rate, which is multiplied by (1-ρ) in the 
policy rule, plays virtually no role in the setting of policy.      
The combination of these two types of mismeasurement also implies that the optimal 
policy rule respond only modestly to the perceived unemployment gap, but relatively strongly to 
the change in the unemployment rate. This is shown in the lower two panels of Figure 3. These 
policy rules that respond more to the change in the unemployment rate use the fact that that the 
direction of the change in the unemployment rate is generally less subject to mismeasurement 
than the absolute level of the gap in the model simulations.  If these measurement problems are 
sufficiently severe, it may be optimal to replace entirely the response to the output gap with a 
response to the change in the gap.  In the case where the value of ρ is unity, such a rule is closely 
related to a rule that targets the price level, as can be seen by integrating equation (5) in terms of 17 
 
levels.  See McCallum (2001), Rudebusch (2002), and Orphanides and Williams (2007b) for 
analysis of the relative merits of gaps and first differences of gaps in policy rules.    
   
The zero lower bound on interest rates 
The discussion of monetary policy rules so far has abstracted from the zero lower bound 
(ZLB) on nominal interest rates.  Because an asset, cash, pays a zero interest rate, it is not 
possible to for short-term nominal interest rates to fall significantly below zero percent.
4  In 
several instances—including the Great Depression in the United States, Japan during much of the 
1990s and 2000-2006, and several countries during the recession that began in late 2007 —the 
ZLB has constrained the ability of central banks to lower the interest rate in the face of a weak 
economy and low inflation.  A concern is that the inability to reduce interest rates below zero can 
impair the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize output and inflation (see See Fuhrer and 
Madigan, 1997, Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, Eggertsson and Woodford , 2003, Coenen , 
Orphanides, and Wieland, 2004, Williams, 2010, and references therein). 
  Research has identified four important implications for monetary policy rules owing to 
the ZLB. First, the monetary policy rule in equation (3) must be modified to account for the zero 
lower bound: 
     max   0,    1                     ̃                                 (6) 
where  ̃    denotes the preferred setting of the interest rate in the previous period that would 
occur absent the ZLB.  This distinction between the actual lagged interest rate and the 
unconstrained rate is crucial for the performance of inertial rules with the ZLB.  If the lagged 
                                                            
4 Because cash is not a perfect substitute for bank reserves, the overnight rate can in principle be somewhat below 
zero, but there is a limit to how negative nominal interest rates can go as long as cash pays zero interest.  18 
 
interest rate appears in the rule, deviations from the unconstrained policy are carried into the 
future, exacerbating the effects of the ZLB (Reifschneider and Williams 2000, Williams 2006).   
Second, the ZLB can imply the existence of multiple steady states (Reifschneider and 
Williams 2000, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe 2001).   For a wide set of macroeconomic 
models, one steady state is characterized by a rate of inflation equal to the negative of the 
equilibrium real interest rate, a zero output gap zero, and a zero nominal interest rate.  Assuming 
the target inflation rate exceeds the negative of the equilibrium real interest rate, a second steady 
state exists.  It is characterized by a rate of inflation equal to the central bank’s target inflation 
rate, a zero output gap, and a nominal interest rate equal to the equilibrium real interest rate plus 
the target inflation rate.  In standard models, the steady state associated with the target inflation 
rate is locally stable in the sense that the economy returns to this steady state following a small 
disturbance.  But, due to the existence of the ZLB, if a large contractionary shock hits the 
economy, monetary policy alone may not be sufficient to bring the inflation rate back to the 
target rate. Instead, depending on the nature of the model economy’s dynamics, the inflation rate 
will either converge to the deflationary steady state or will diverge to an infinitely negative 
inflation rate.  Fiscal policy can be used to eliminate the deflationary steady state and assure that 
the economy returns to the desired steady state inflation rate (Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja, 
2008).
5  
Third, the ZLB has implications for the specification and parameterization of the 
monetary policy rule.  For example, Reifschneider and Williams (2002) find that increasing the 
response to the output gap helps reduce the effects of the ZLB.  Such an aggressive response to 
output gaps prescribes greater monetary stimulus before and after episodes when the ZLB 
                                                            
5 See also Eggertsson and Woodford (2006).  In addition to fiscal policy, researchers have examined the use of 
alternative monetary policy instruments, such as the quantity of reserves, the exchange rate, and longer-term interest 
rates.  See McCallum (2000), Svensson (2001), and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) for discussions of these topics. 19 
 
constrains policy, which helps lessen the effects when the ZLB constrains policy.  However, 
there are limits to this approach.  First, it generally increases the variability of inflation and 
interest rates, which may be undesirable.  In addition, Williams (2010) shows that too large a 
response to the output gap can be counterproductive.  The ZLB creates an asymmetry between 
the very strong responses to positive output gaps and truncated responses to negative output gaps 
that increases output gap variability overall. 
Given the limitations of the approach of simply responding more strongly to output gaps, 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000, 2002) argue for modifications to the specification of the 
policy rule.  They consider two alternative specifications of simple policy rules.  In one, the 
policy rule is modified to lower the interest rate more aggressively than otherwise in the vicinity 
of the ZLB.  In particular, they consider a rule where the interest rate is cut to zero if the 
unconstrained interest rate falls below 1 percent.  This asymmetric rule encapsulates the principle 
of adding as much monetary stimulus as possible near the ZLB in order to offset the effects of 
constraint on monetary stimulus when the ZLB binds.  In the second version of the modified 
rule, the interest rate is kept below the “notional” interest rate following episodes when the ZLB 
is a binding constraint on policy.  Specifically, the interest rate is kept at zero until the absolute 
value of the cumulative sum of negative deviations of the actual interest rate from the notional 
values equals that that occurred during the period that ZLB constrained policy.  This approach 
implies that the rule “makes up” afterwards for lost monetary stimulus resulting from the ZLB.   
Both of these approaches work well at mitigating the effects of the ZLB in model 
simulations when the public is assumed to know the features of the modified policy rule.  
However, these approaches rely on unusual behavior by the central bank in the vicinity of the 
ZLB, which may confuse private agents and thereby entail unintended and potentially 20 
 
undesirable consequences.  An alternative approach advocated by Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003) is to adopt an explicit price-level target, rather than an inflation target.  Reifschneider and 
Williams (2000) and Williams (2006, 2010) find that such price-level targeting rules are 
effective at reducing the costs of the ZLB as long as the public understands the policy rule.  Such 
an approach works well because, like the second modified policy rule discussed above, it 
promises more monetary stimulus and higher inflation in the future than a standard inflation-
targeting policy rule.  This anticipation of future monetary stimulus boosts economic activity and 
inflation when the economy is at the ZLB, thereby mitigating its effects.  This channel is highly 
effective in models where expectations of future policy have important effects on current output 
and inflation.  But, as pointed out by Walsh (2009), central bankers have so far been unwilling to 
embrace this approach in practice.        
Finally, the ZLB provides an argument for a higher target inflation rate than otherwise 
would be the case.  The quantitative importance of the ZLB depends on the frequency and degree 
to which the ZLB constraint is expected to bind, a key determinant of which is the target 
inflation rate. If the target inflation rate is sufficiently high, the ZLB will rarely impinge on 
monetary policy and the macroeconomy.  As discussed in Williams (2010), the consensus from 
the literature on the ZLB is that a 2 percent inflation target is sufficient to avoid significant costs 
in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, based on the historical pattern of disturbances hitting 
the economy over the past several decades.  This figure is close to the inflation targets followed, 





Responding to other variables 
A frequently-heard criticism of simple monetary policy rules is that they ignore valuable 
information about the economy.  In other words, they are simply too simple for the real-world 
(Svensson 2003 and Mishkin 2007).  However, as shown in Williams (2003), even in large-scale 
macroeconometric models like FRB/US, adding additional lags or leads of  inflation or the 
output gap  to the three-parameter rule of the type discussed above yields trivial gains in terms of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  The same is true for other empirical macro models (Rudebusch 
and Svensson 1999, Levin and Williams 2003, Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999).  Similar 
results are found using micro-founded DSGE models where the central bank aims to maximize 
household welfare (Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams, 2005, Edge, Laubach, and 
Williams, 2010).    
    One specific issue that has attracted a great deal of attention is adding various asset 
prices, such as the exchange rate or equity prices, to the policy rule (see Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler, 2001, Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, and Woodford, 2003, for discussions and references). 
Research has shown that he magnitude of the benefits from responding to asset prices is 
generally found to be small in existing estimated models.  For example, the FRB/US model 
includes a wide variety of asset prices which may deviate from fundamentals.  Nonetheless, 
including asset price movements (or, alternatively, non-fundamental movements in asset prices) 
to simple policy rules yields negligible benefits in terms of macroeconomic stabilization in this 
model. One reason for this is that asset price movements unrelated to fundamentals lead to 
movements in output and inflation in the model.  The simple policy rule responds to and offsets 
these movements in inflation and the output gap.
6  Moreover, in practice it is difficult to 
                                                            
6 Of course, if the policy objective included the stabilization of asset prices, then the optimal simple rule 
would need to contain the asset prices as well as the other objective variables.       22 
 
accurately measure nonfundamental movements in asset prices, arguing for muted responses to 
these noisy variables.  
 
3.  Robustness of Policy Rules 
Much of the early research focused on the performance of simple policy rules under 
“ideal” circumstances where the central bank has an excellent knowledge of the economy and 
expectations are rational.  But, it had long been recognized that such assumptions are unlikely to 
hold in real-world policy applications and that policy prescriptions needed to be robust to 
uncertainty (McCallum 1988, Taylor 1993b).  Research has therefore focused on the issue of 
designing robust policy rules that perform well in a wide set of economic environments (see, for 
example, Brock, Durlauf, and West, 2003, 2007, Brock, Durlauf, Nason, and Rondina , 2007, 
Levin and Williams, 2003, Levin, Wieland, Williams, 1999, 2003, Orphandies and Williams, 
2002, 2006, 2007b, 2008,  Taylor and Wieland , 2009, and Tetlow, 2006).     
Evaluating policy rules in a variety of models has the advantage of helping identify 
characteristics of policy rules that are robust to model misspecification and those that are not. 
Early efforts at evaluating robustness took the form of taking evaluating candidate policy rules 
through a set of models and comparing the results with regard to macroeconomic performance.  
Later, this approach was formalized as a problem of decision making under uncertainty.  
One example of robustness evaluation is the joint effort of several researchers to compare 
the effects of policy rules in different models, reported in Taylor (1999b).  In that project, five 
different candidate policy rules were checked for robustness across a variety of models. These 
policy rules were of the form of equation (3); the parameters are reported in Table 1. Note that 
the interest rate reacts to the lagged interest rate with a coefficient of one in Rules I and II, with 23 
 
Rule I having higher weight on inflation compared to output and Rule II has a smaller weight on 
inflation compared to output. Thus these two rules have considerable “inertia” in the terminology 
used above.  Rule III is the Taylor Rule. Rule IV has a coefficient of 1.0 rather than 0.5 on real 
output, which had been suggested by Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997).  Rule V is the 
rule proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999); it places very little weight on real output and 
incorporates a greater than unity coefficient on the lagged interest rate. 
 
Table 1 
Policy Rule Coefficients 
   _____________α_____β_____ ρ___ 
Rule I    3.0   0.8   1.0 
Rule II   1.2   1.0   1.0 
Rule III   0.5   0.5   0.0 
Rule IV   0.5   1.0   0.0 
Rule V   1.5   .06   1.3 
_____________________________ 
 
In this exercise, nine models were considered (see Taylor 1999b).  For each of the 
models, the standard deviations of the inflation rate, of real output, and of the interest rate were 
computed.   Taylor (1999b) reports that the sum of the ranks of the three rules shows that Rule I 
is most robust if inflation fluctuations are the sole measure of performance; it ranks first in terms 
of inflation variability for all but one model for which there is a clear ordering. For output, Rule 
II has the best sum of the ranks, which reflects its relatively high response to output. However, 
regardless of the objective function weights, Rule V has the worst sum of the ranks of these three 
policy rules, ranking first for only one model (the Rotemberg-Woodford model) in the case of 
output. Comparing rules I, II, III with Rules III and IV) shows that the lagged interest rate rules 24 
 
do not dominate rules without a lagged interest rate.  Indeed, for a number of models the rules 
with lagged interest rates are unstable or have extraordinarily large variances. 
  This type of exercise has been expanded to include other models and to formally search 
for the “best” simple rule evaluated over a set of models.  One issue that this literature has faced 
is the characterization of the problem of optimal policy under uncertainty.  Different approaches 
have been used, including Bayesian, minimax, and minimax regret (see Brock, Durlauf, and 
West, 2003, and Kuester and Wieland, 2010, for detailed discussions).   
  The Bayesian approach assumes that the existence of well-defined probabilities, pj, for 
each model j in a set of n models  The choice of the optimal rule under uncertainty then is the 
choice of the parameters of the rule that minimizes the expected loss over the set of models. In 
particular, denote the central bank loss generated in model j by Lj.  The Bayesian central bank’s 
expected loss, L
B, is given by: 
     ∑     
 
    .        ( 7 )  
This formulation treats the probabilities as constant; see Brock, Durlauf, and West 2003 for the 
description of the expected loss in a dynamic context where the probabilities are updated each 
period.   
Levin and Williams (2003) apply this methodology to a set of three models taken from 
Woodford (2003), Fuhrer (2000), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).  They place equal 
probabilities on these three models.  They find that the Bayesian optimal simple three-parameter 
rule is characterized by a moderate degree of policy inertia, with ρ no greater than 0.7.  In the 
two forward-looking models, the optimal response to the lagged interest rate is much higher than 
0.7.  In contrast, in the backward-looking Rudebusch-Svensson model, the optimal policy is 25 
 
characterized by very little inertia.  In fact, in that model, highly inertial policies can lead to 
explosive behavior. 
The robustness of simple rules to alternative parameterizations can be illustrated using 
the concept of fault tolerance (Levin and Williams 2003). Figure 5 plots percent the deviations of 
the central bank loss relative to the fully optimal policies for the three models studied by Levin 
and Williams for variations in the three parameters of the policy rule. This figure shows results 
for the case of λ = 0.  The upper panel shows how the central bank loss changes in the three 
models as the value of ρ ranges from 0 to 1.5.  In constructing these curves, the other two 
parameters of the policy rule are held constant at their respective optimal values. The middle and 
bottom panels show the results when the coefficient on inflation and the output gap, respectively, 
are varied.  In cases where the curves are relatively flat, the policy is said to be fault tolerant, 
meaning that model misspecification does not lead to a large increase in loss relative to what 
could be achieved.  If the curve is steep, the policy is said to be fault intolerant.  Robust policies 
are those that lie in the fault tolerant regions of the set of models under consideration.         
As seen in the figure, inertial policies lead to very large increases in the central bank loss 
in the Rudebusch-Svensson model. And highly inertial policies with values of ρ greater than one 
are damaging in the Fuhrer model as well.  The reason for this result in the Rudebusch-Svensson 
models is that monetary policy effects grow slowly over time and there is no feedback of these 
future effects of policy back onto the current economy.  A highly inertial policy will be behind 
the curve in shifting the stance of policy, amplifying fluctuations and potentially leading to 
explosive oscillations.  In forward-looking models, in contrast, expected future policy actions 
help stabilize the current economy, which reduces the need for large movements in interest rates. 26 
 
Nonetheless, excessive policy inertia with ρ > 1 is undesirable in forward-looking models with 
strong real and nominal frictions such as the Fuhrer model and FRB/US. 
The choice of the responses to inflation and the output gap can be quite different when 
viewed from the perspective of robustness across models rather than optimality in a single 
model.  For example, in the case shown here, macroeconomic performance in the Fuhrer model 
suffers when the response to inflation is too great.  The case of the optimal response to the output 
illuminates the tension between optimal and robust policies.  In two of the models, the optimal 
response is near zero.  However, such a response is highly costly in the third (Rudebusch-
Svensson) model.  Similarly, the relatively large response to the output gap called for by the 
Rudebusch-Svensson model performs poorly in the other two models.  Evidently, the robust 
policy differs significantly from each optimal policy by having a modest response to the output 
gap that is suboptimal in each model, but highly costly in none.   
  Orphanides and Williams (2006) conduct a robustness analysis, where the uncertainty is 
over the way that agents form expectations and the magnitude of fluctuations in the equilibrium 
real interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment.  Figure 6 plots the fault tolerances for 
three models that they study.  For this exercise, the coefficient on the lagged interest rate was set 
to zero.  In one model, labeled “perfect knowledge,” private agents possess rational expectations 
and the equilibrium real interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment are constant and 
known.  The second model, labeled ‘learning,” replaces the assumption of rational expectations 
with the assumption that private agents form expectations using an estimated forecasting model. 
The third model, labeled “learning + natural rate misperceptions,” adds uncertainty about the 
equilibrium real interest rate and the natural rate of unemployment to the model with learning.  27 
 
  The optimal policy in the “perfect knowledge” model performs poorly in the models with 
learning and natural rate misperceptions.  In particular, as seen in the upper panel of the figure, 
the “perfect knowledge” model prescribes a modest response to inflation in the policy rule.  Such 
a policy is highly problematic in the other models with learning because it allows inflation 
expectations to drift over time. The optimal policies in the models with learning feature much 
stronger responses to inflation and thereby tighter control of inflation expectations. Such policies 
engender relatively small cost in performance in the “perfect knowledge” model and represent a 
robust strategy for this set of models.       
  As mentioned above, the Bayesian approach to policy rule evaluation under model 
uncertainty requires one to specify probabilities on the various models. In practice, this may be 
difficult or impossible to do.  In such cases, alternative approaches are minimiax and minimax 
regret.  The minimiax criterion, L
M, is given by: 
    m a x        ,   ,…,    .        ( 8 )  
Levin and Williams (2003) and Kuester and Wieland (2010) analyze the properties of minimax 
simple rules.  One problem with this approach is that it can be very sensitive to outlier models. 
Hybrid approaches such as that of Kuester and Wieland (2010) and ambiguity aversion described 
by Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) allow one to combine the Bayesian approach with 
robustness to “worst-case” models.  This is done less formally by examining the performance of 
the candidate policy not only in terms of the average performance across the models, but also in 
each individual model.   
A recurring result in the literature is that optimal Bayesian policy rules entail relatively 
small stabilization costs, relative to the optimal policy, in nearly all the models in the set (see 
Levin and Williams, 2003, Levin, Wieland, Williams, 1999, 2003, Orphandies and Williams, 28 
 
2002, 2008, and references therein).  That is, the cost of robustness to model uncertainty tends to 
be relatively small, while the benefits can be very large.   
 
4. Optimal Policy vs. Simple Rules 
  An alternative approach to that of simple monetary policy rules is that of optimal policy 
(Giannoni and Woodford, 2005, Svensson, 2010, Woodford, 2010).  The optimal policy 
approach treats the monetary policy problem as a standard intertemporal optimization problem, 
which yields optimalilty conditions in terms of first-order conditions and Lagrange multipliers.  
As discussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2005), the optimal policy can be formulated as a single 
equation in terms of leads and lags of the objective variables (inflation rate, output gap, etc.).  A 
key theoretical advantage of the optimal policy approach is that it, unlike simple monetary policy 
rules, takes into account all relevant information for monetary policy. 
The value of this informational advantage has been found to be surprisingly small in 
model simulations, even when the central bank is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the 
model.  Of course, in small enough models, the optimal policy may be equivalent to a simple 
policy rule, as in Ball (1999). But, in larger models, this is no longer the case.  Williams (2003), 
using the large-scale Federal Reserve Board FRB/US model, finds that a simple three-parameter 
monetary policy rule yields outcomes in terms of the weighted sum of variances of the inflation 
rate and the output gap that are remarkably close to those obtained under the fully optimal 
policy. This result is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the policy frontiers from the FRB/US 
model between the fully optimal policy and the three-parameter rule.  For a policymaker who 
cares equally about inflation and the output gap (λ = 1), the standard deviations of both the 
inflation rate and the output gap are less than 0.1 percentage point apart between the frontiers.  29 
 
   Similar results are obtained for a wide variety of estimated macroeconomic models 
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999, Levin and Williams, 2003, Levin, Onatski, Williams, and 
Williams, 2005, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006, Edge, Laubach, and Williams 2010).  Giononni 
and Woodford (2005) provide the theoretical basis for why simple rules perform so well.  They 
show that the fully optimal policy can be described as a relationship between leads and lags of 
the variables in the loss function.  Evidently, simple rules of the type studied in the literature 
capture the key aspects of this relationship between the objective variables. 
One potential shortcoming of the optimal control approach is that it ignores uncertainty 
about the specification of the model (see McCallum and Nelson 2005 for a discussion).  
Although in principle one can incorporate various types of uncertainty to the analysis of optimal 
policy, in practice computational feasibility limits what can be done.  As a result, existing 
optimal control policy analysis is typically done using a single reference model, which is 
assumed to be true.   
Levin and Williams (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2008) find that optimal 
policies can perform very poorly if the central bank's reference model is misspecified, while 
simple robust rules perform well in a wide variety of models, as discussed above. This research 
provides examples where optimal polices can be overly fine tuned to the particular assumptions 
of the model.  If those assumptions prove to be correct, all is well.  But, if the assumptions turn 
out to be false, the costs can be high.  In contrast, simple monetary policy rules are designed to 
take account of only the most basic principle of monetary policy of leaning against the wind of 
inflation and output movements.  Because they are not fine tuned to specific assumptions, they 
are more robust to mistaken assumptions.  Figure 7, taken from Orphanides and Williams (2008), 
illustrates this point.  The optimal control policy derived under the assumption of rational 30 
 
expectations performs slightly better than the two simple rules if the model where expectations 
are in fact rational.  But, in the alternative models where agents form expectations using 
estimated forecasting models, indexed by the learning parameter κ, the performance of the 
optimal control policy deteriorates sharply while that of the simple rules holds up well.  
One potential solution to this lack of robustness is to design optimal control rules that are 
more robust to model misspecification.  One such approach is to use robust control techniques 
(Hansen and Sargent 2007).  A n alternative approach is to bias the objective function so that the 
optimal control policy is more robust to model uncertainty.  The results for such a “modified 
optimal policy” is shown in Figure 5.  In this case, the modification is to reduce the weights 
placed on stabilizing unemployment and interest rates in the objective function when computing 
the optimal policy (see Orphanides and Williams 2008 for a discussion).  Interestingly, although 
this policy is more robust than the standard optimal policy, overall it doesn’t do as well as the 
optimal simple inertial rule, as seen in the figure.   
A final issue with optimal policies is that they tend to be very complicated and potentially 
difficult to communicate to the public, relative to simple rules.  In an environment where the 
public lacks a perfect understanding of the policy strategy, this complexity may make it harder 
for private agents to learn, creating confusion and expectational errors, as discussed by 
Orphanides and Williams (2008).   
These robustness studies characterize optimal policy in terms of an optimal feedback 
rule—a function relating policy instruments to lagged policy instruments and other observable 
variables in such a way that the objective function is maximized for a particular model.  This 
optimal feedback rule is then compared with simple (not fully optimal) rules by simulating the 
rules in different models.  There are a variety of ways other than feedback rules to characterize 31 
 
optimal policy. For example, as mentioned above the policy instruments could depend on 
forecasts of future variables, as discussed by Giannoni and Woodford (2005).  In general there 
are countless ways of representing optimal policy in a given model.  When simulating how 
optimal policy works in a different model, the results could depend on which of these 
representations of optimal policy one uses  An open question, therefore, is whether one 
characterization of optimal policy might be more robust than those studied so far. 
 
5. Learning from Experience Before, During and After the Great Moderation 
  Another approach to learn about the usefulness of simple policy rules is look at actual 
macroeconomic performance when policy operates, or does not operate, close to such rules. The 
Great Moderation period is good for this purpose because economic performance was unusually 
favorable during that period, either compared to the period before or, so far at least, the period 
after.  
By all accounts the Great Moderation in the United States began in the early 1980s.  In 
particular, it is reasonable to date the beginning of the Great Moderation with the first month of 
the expansion following the 1981-82 recession (November 1982) and to date its end at the 
beginning of the 2007-09 recession (December 2007).   Not only did inflation and interest rates 
and their volatilities diminish compared with the experience of the 1970s, but the volatility of 
real GDP reached lows never seen before.  Economic expansions became longer and stronger 
while recessions became shorter and shallower.  No matter what metric you use—the variance of 
real GDP growth, the variance of the real GDP gap, the average length of expansions, the 
frequency of recessions, or the duration of recessions—there was a huge improvement in 
economic performance. There was also an improvement in price stability with the inflation rate 32 
 
much lower and less volatile than the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This same 
type of improved macroeconomic performance also occurred in other developed countries and 
most developing countries (Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause, 2006). 
  Is there evidence that policy adhered more to simple policy rules during the Great 
Moderation?   Yes. Indeed the evidence shows that not only the Fed, but also many other central 
banks became markedly more responsive and systematic in adjusting to developments in the 
economy when changing their policy interest rate. This is a policy regime change in the 
econometric sense: one can observe it by estimating, during different time periods, the 
coefficients of the central bank’s policy rule which describes of how the central bank sets its 
interest rate in response to inflation and real GDP.  
  A number of researchers used this technique to detect a regime shift, including Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Woodford (2003), and Stock and Watson 
(2002). Such studies have shown that the Fed’s interest rate moves were less responsive to 
changes in inflation and to real GDP in the period before the 1980s.  After the mid 1980s, the 
reaction coefficients increased significantly. The reaction coefficient to inflation nearly doubled.  
The estimated reaction of the interest rate to a one percentage point increase in inflation rose 
from about three-quarters to about one-and-a-half.  The reaction to real output also rose.  In 
general the coefficients are much closer to the parameters of a policy rule like the Taylor rule in 
the post mid-1980s period than they were before.  Similar results are found over longer sample 
periods for the United States.  The implied reaction coefficients were also low in the highly 
volatile pre-World War II period (Romer and Romer 2002). 33 
 
 Cecchetti  et al (2007) and others have shown that this same type of shift occurred in other 
countries.  They pinpoint the regime shift as having occurred for a number of countries in the 
early 1980s by showing that deviations from a Taylor rule began to diminish around that time.  
  While this research establishes that the Great Moderation and the change in policy rules 
began about the same time, it does not prove they are connected. Formal statistical techniques or 
macroeconomic model simulation can help assess causality.  Stock and Watson (2002) used a 
statistical time-series decomposition technique to assess the causality.  They found that the 
change in monetary policy had an effect on performance, though they also found that other 
factors—mainly a reduction in other sources of shocks to the economy (inventories, supply 
factors)—were responsible for a larger part of the reduction in volatility. They showed that the 
shift in the monetary policy rule led to a more efficient point on the output-inflation variance 
tradeoff.  Similarly, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006) used a more structural model 
and empirically studied many different countries. For 20 of the 21countries which had 
experienced a moderation in the variance of inflation and output, they found that better monetary 
policy accounted for over 80 percent of the moderation.   
   Some additional evidence comes from establishing a connection between the research on 
policy rules and the decisions of policy makers.  Asso, Kahn, and Leeson (2007) have 
documented a large number of references to policy rules and related developments in the 
transcripts of the FOMC in the 1990s.  Meyer (2004) makes it clear that there was a framework 
underlying the policy based on such considerations. If you compare Meyer’s (2004) account with 
Maisel’s (1973), you see a very clear difference in the policy framework.   
  So far we have considered evidence in favor of a shift in the policy rule and improved 
economic performance during the Great Moderation.  Is it possible that the end of the Great 34 
 
Moderations was due to another monetary policy shift?  In thinking about this question, it is 
important to recall that the Great Moderation was already nearly 15 years old before economists 
started noticing it, documenting it, determining the date of its beginning, and trying to determine 
whether or not it was due to monetary policy. It will probably take as long to draw definitive 
conclusions about the end of the Great Moderation, and after all we hope that Great Moderation 
II will start soon. Nevertheless, Taylor (2007) provides evidence that in 2003-2005, policy 
deviated from the policy rule that worked well during the Great Moderation.      
 
 
Rules as Measures of Accountability 
  This review of historical performance distinguishes periods when policy is close to a 
policy rule and when it is not.  In other words, it focuses on whether or not there is a deviation 
from a policy rule.  In a sense, such deviations from policy rules—at least large persistent 
deviations—can serve as measures of accountability for monetary policy makers.  Congressional 
or parliamentary committees sometimes use such measures when questioning central bankers, 
and public debates over monetary policy decisions are frequently about whether policy is 
deviating from a policy rule or not.    
  It is important to point out that using policy rules in this way, while quite natural, was not 
emphasized in the many of the original proposals for interest rate rules, such as the one in Taylor 
(1993a).  Rather the policy recommendation was that the rule should be used as an aid for 
making decisions in a more predictable, rule-like, manner:  Accordingly, the Federal Reserve 
staff would show to the FOMC the paths of the federal funds rate under the Taylor rule and other 
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whether or not to change the interest rate.  Policy rules would thus inform policy decisions; it 
would serve as a rough benchmark for making decisions not a mechanical formula.  As Kohn 
(2007) has described in his analysis of the 2002-2004 period and the response to Taylor (2007), 
this is how policy rules came to be used at the FOMC. 
  The rationale for using deviations from policy rules as measures of accountability came 
later and is based on historical and international experience over the past two decades.  Historical 
work has shown that there were big deviations from policy rules at the times that performance 
was less than satisfactory.  A question is whether in the future policy rules will be used more 
often in this more specific way as a measure of accountability rather than as simply a guide or 
aid for policy decisions.   If rules become more commonly used for accountability, then policy 
makers will have to explain the reasons for the deviations from the rules and be held accountable 
for them.   As stated by Levin and Taylor (2009) “on occasion, of course, policymakers might 
find compelling reasons to deviate from the prescriptions of any simple rule, but in those 
circumstances, transparency and credibility might well call for clear communication about the 
rationale for that policy strategy.” 
 
Conclusion 
Research on rules for monetary policy rules over the past two decades has made 
important progress in understanding the properties of simple policy rules and their robustness to 
model misspecification.   Simple normative rules to guide central bank decisions for the interest 
rate first emerged from research on simulations of empirical monetary models with rational 
expectations and sticky prices in the 1970s and 1980s; this research built on work going back to 
Smith, Ricardo, Fisher, Wicksell, and Friedman in the sense that the research objective was to 36 
 
find a monetary policy which both cushioned the economy to shocks and did not cause its own 
shocks.  
Over the past two decades, research on policy rules has shown that simple rules have 
important robustness advantages over fully optimal or more complex rules in that they work well 
in a variety of models.  Experience has shown that simple rules also have worked well in the real 
world.  Progress has also been made in understanding how to adjust simple rules to deal with 
measurement error, expectations, learning, and the lower bound on interest rates.  That said, the 
search for better and more robust policy rules is never done and further research is needed that 
incorporates a wider set of models and economic environments, especially models that take 
account international linkages of monetary policy and economies.  In addition, many of the 
studies of robustness have looked at only a handful of models in isolation from all the other 
potential models.  A desirable goal is to include large numbers of alternative models in one 
study. Another goal of future research should bean a better understanding of the implications of 
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